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CRIMINAL LAW-THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE: AN INTERPRE­
TIVE ANALYSIS ON WHETHER A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR CARRY­
ING A CONCEALED WEAPON IS A "CRIME OF VIOLENCE" UNDER 
THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
INTRODucnON 
In United States v. Price, the defendant Price pleaded guilty to 
the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 
federallaw. 1 During sentencing, the court considered Price's prior 
Florida conviction of carrying a concealed weapon a "crime of vio­
lence" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guide­
lines).2 This resulted in an enhancement of Price's sentence, from 
twelve to eighteen months,3 to a thirty-month sentence.4 On ap­
peal, Price argued that his prior conviction for carrying a concealed 
weapon under Florida law was improperly characterized as a crime 
of violence, and thus, his sentence was incorrect.s Relying on its 
own precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af­
firmed the trial judge's sentence.6 Therefore, the judge's determi­
nation that Price's prior conviction of carrying a concealed weapon 
was a crime of violence directly and substantially impacted the sen­
tence that Price received. Currently the courts of appeals disagree 
as to whether a prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon is 
a crime of violence under the Guidelines.? This split among the 
federal courts of appeals concerning the proper classification (vio­
1. United States v. Price, 132 F. App'x 341 (11th Cir. 2005). Price was convicted 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(l) and 924(a)(2). [d. 
2. [d. at 342. 
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5A, at 377 (2005). Price's base 
level would have been set at fourteen pursuant to section 2K2.1(a)(6), which provides 
for a base level of fourteen if the defendant was a "prohibited person at the time the 
defendant committed the instant offense." [d. § 2K2.1(a)(6). "[A] prohibited person 
[is] any person described in 18 U.S.c. § 922(g) ...." [d. § 2K2.1, cmt., n.3. Price would 
have likewise received a reduction of three points for "accept[ing] responsibility," set­
ting his final base level offense at eleven. See id. §§ 3El.1(a)-(b). 
4. Price received a three-level reduction as a result of accepting responsibility 
pursuant to the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 3E1.1(a)-(b), 
therefore his sentencing base level offense was seventeen. Price, 132 F. App'x at 342. 
5. Price, 132 F. App'x at 341. 
6. [d. at 343. 
7. See infra Part I.F. 
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lent or non-violent) of a concealed weapons conviction has created 
a disparity in our federal criminal justice system.s 
This Note is written with the purpose of resolving the disparity 
between the circuit courts' interpretations of the crime of violence 
provision under the Guidelines and whether a prior conviction for 
carrying a concealed weapon is included within its scope. Part I will 
discuss the origin and operation of the Guidelines. This Part will 
also analyze the crime of carrying a concealed weapon by compar­
ing the various state laws governing the crime. Furthermore, this 
Part will examine the current case law, analyzing the split among 
the circuit courts over the issue of whether a prior conviction for 
carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence. 
In Part II, this Note will argue several points that aid in ob­
taining the proper scope of the crime of violence provision, and will 
ultimately find that it does not include the crime of carrying a con­
cealed weapon. First, under a common canon of statutory interpre­
tation, the crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded from 
the scope of the crime of violence provision. Also, while the courts 
of appeals have diverged in their conclusions on this issue, they 
have all taken the same insufficient approach in the analysis of the 
provision. Therefore, this Note will set forth a new approach to 
analyzing the crime of violence provision-an objective categorical 
approach.9 By applying this approach, Part II will provide further 
reasoning and support as to why the crime of carrying a concealed 
weapon is not a crime of violence. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. 	 Criminal Sentencing in the United States: A Brief Analysis of 
the Evolution of the Criminal Sentencing Structure 
Historically, the United States has implemented various sys­
tems of criminal punishment. While the roles of the three branches 
of government have been in a constant evolution with respect to 
sentencing, they have always mirrored, in some form, the general 
theory of "separation of powers."lO No one branch has ever had 
8. Id. 
9. While the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits arrived at differing conclusions about 
whether a concealed weapons conviction is a "crime of violence," both did so by a 
"subjective" evaluation of the risk created by the conduct. For further discussion, see 
infra Part ILB. 
10. The United States sought to apply the theory of separation of powers to crim­
inal sentencing. By separating powers among the branches of the government, with 
each branch having equal power and separate duties, separation of power ensures a 
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overriding authority, or rather, exercised overriding authority in the 
area of sentencing with the exception of the executive branch, 
which has the power of the presidential pardon.11 Instead, criminal 
punishment has been the result of the interaction between the three 
branches of government. This idea of cooperation between the 
branches in sentencing can be traced back even further than the 
creation of the federal courts.12 For example, the 1789 Act to regu­
late the Collection of Duties provided that if a person swears or 
affirms falsely, he or she shall be punished by fine or imprisonment, 
"in the discretion of the court before whom the conviction shall be 
had, so as the fine shall not exceed one thousand dollars, and the 
term of imprisonment shall not exceed twelve months."13 This Act 
depicts the three-branch14 sentencing structure found in the federal 
criminal system-that the court has discretionary powers to pre­
scribe a particular sentence, as long as that sentence is within the 
range provided by Congress, with the presidential pardon existing 
in the background.15 
The sharing of power between the branches in the area of sen­
tencing evolved further with the creation of the parole system. In 
1910, Congress established the first parole system whereby a com­
mission would be established in every prison, and would have the 
system of checks and balances that best serves a democratic form of government. The 
notion of separating the powers to achieve this is best represented by the Federalist No. 
51, which declared that 
[t]o what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice 
the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down 
in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these 
exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by 
so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several con­
stituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each 
other in their proper places. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). 
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (declaring that "[t]he President ... shall have 
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States"). 
12. Compare An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on 
the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into 
the United States, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 29, 46-47 (1789) (setting a broad range for sentenc­
ing and leaving the court with discretion to impose the proper sentence within that 
range) (signed into law on July 31, 1789), with Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (passed 
two months later on September 24, 1789, which established the federal courts). 
13. An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the ton­
nage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the 
United States, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 29, 46-47 (1789). 
14. Only the Legislature and Judiciary appear explicitly in the statute, however, 
the constitutional provision of the presidential pardon is always present. 
15. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sen­
tencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892 (1990). 
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authority to release certain prisoners who the commission believed 
were rehabilitated and would "live and remain at liberty without 
violating the laws. "16 Under the parole system, immediate discre­
tion was divided not only between Congress and the courts, but also 
an independent parole board. A defendant's sentence became in­
determinate, and he should be incarcerated "until he or she had 
reformed."17 The authority was divided between judges and the pa­
role board. Judges retained the authority to suspend a defendant's 
sentence,18 while the parole board could release a defendant after 
one-third of his sentence had been served.19 
After decades of a "parole" sentencing structure that was 
largely based on judicial discretion, the political atmosphere con­
cerning the punishment of criminals changed in the 1980s.20 Inde­
terminate sentencing was producing unsatisfactory results in the 
minds of members of Congress.21 As a result, in 1984, President 
Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act,22 which 
contained several criminal law reforms including the Sentencing 
Reform Act.23 The Sentencing Reform Act established the Sen­
tencing Commission that was charged with creating the Guide­
lines24 to correct the problems with the existing federal sentencing 
system. The roles of the three branches had changed once again 
and the authority of the judiciary in sentencing was reduced in or­
der to accomplish the goals of Congress. 
16. An Act to parole United States prisoners, ch. 387, § 3, 36 Stat. 819,819 (1910) 
(repealed 1984). 
17. Nagel, supra note 15, at 894. 
18. KATE STITH & JOSE A. Cabranes, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDE· 
LINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 19 (1998). The Supreme Court in Ex parte United 
States, 242 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1916), held that federal courts could not suspend a sentence 
if the legislature provided a statutory minimum sentence for the crime. Judicial power 
to suspend a sentence was reinstated when Congress enacted the Probation Act of 1925, 
ch. 521, § 1, 43 Stat. 1259, 1259. 
19. An Act To parole United States prisoners, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. at 819 (codi­
fied at 18 U.S.C §§ 4202-4208 (repealed 1984». 
20. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 29-35. 
21. See id. at 43-48. 
22. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, 98 Stat. 
1837, 1976 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C and 28 U.S.C). 
23. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 
1837,1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C §§ 3551-3673; 28 U.S.C §§ 991-998 
(2000». 
24. 28 U.S.C § 994. 
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The Sentencing Commission25 was created to establish a suc­
cessful system of punishm'ent that operates with the express pur­
pose of efficiently, fairly, and realistically punishing a particular 
crime.26 Instead of establishing a singular and primary purpose of 
punishment to which all sentences must conform in principle, and 
allowing latitude for judicial discretion to impose the correct sen­
tence,27 the Guidelines provide an objective valuation of crime and 
an objective measure for punishment. Furthermore, the Guidelines 
purport to pursue all four of the purposes and principles of punish­
ment-deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation.28 
The Guidelines also effectively reduce the sharing of the responsi­
bility of criminal punishment between the branches by instituting a 
uniform, mechanical system of punishment.29 Thus, judicial discre­
tion in criminal sentencing has been diminished, essentially chang­
ing the balance among the branches.3D 
25. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.c. 
§§ 3551-3673 (2000); 28 U.S.c. §§ 991-998 (2000)). 
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1Al.1, editorial 
note, at 2, (declaring that "Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a 
system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different 
severity"); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 104 (quoting a letter from the 
Honorable Stephen S. Trott, Associate Attorney General, on behalf of the U.S. Depart­
ment of Justice to Hon. William Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commis­
sion dated April 7, 1987, that read, in part, "Simply stated, unwarranted disparity 
caused by broad judicial discretion is the ill that the Sentencing Reform Act seeks to 
cure"). 
27. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 38-39 (discussing Senator 
Edward Kennedy, who proposed versions of Sentence Reform bills beginning in the 
1970s, because he viewed "sentencing in the federal courts as 'a disgrace,' 'a national 
scandal,' a 'glaring flaw,' in 'utter disarray,' 'hopelessly inconsistent,' 'arbitrary,' and 
'desperately' in need of reform"). 
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1Al.1, editorial 
note, at 2 (declaring that the "guidelines ... will further the basic purposes of criminal 
punishment, i.e., deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment 
[retributive punishment], and rehabilitating the offender"). "Deterrent punishment" is 
defined as "[p]unishment intended to deter the offender and others from committing 
crimes and to make an example of the offender so that like-minded people are warned 
of the consequences of crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (8th ed. 2004). "Inca­
pacitation" is defined as the "action of disabling ...." Id. at 775. "Retributive punish­
ment" is defined as "[p]unishment intended to satisfy the community's retaliatory sense 
of indignation that is provoked by injustice." Id. at 1270. "Rehabilitation" is defined as 
"[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal's character and outlook so that he or she 
can function in society without committing other crimes." Id. at 1311. 
29. The term "mechanical" refers, in particular, to the Sentencing Table, where 
sentences are calculated according to a numerical standard. See infra text accompany­
ing notes 35-37. 
30. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 4-5 (noting that the Guidelines 
permit the judge to "depart" from the sentence prescribed by the Guidelines in only 
two narrow circumstances). 
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B. The Sentencing Guidelines 
Congress vested the Sentencing Commission with the power to 
create a sentencing system that 
provide[s] certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sen­
tencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among de­
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to 
permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or 
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of 
general sentencing practices; and [to] reflect, to the extent practi­
cable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates 
to the criminal justice process.31 
Congress directed the Commission to focus on two broad factors 
when imposing a sentence: (1) the current offense and the charac­
teristics of the defendant32 and (2) the need for the punishment.33 
The Sentencing Commission, therefore, attempted to create an ob­
jective system of determining punishment, and this culminated in 
the formation of the Sentencing Table. As a result, the interplay 
between the branches of government profoundly changed with both 
the abandonment of the parole system and the institution of a sys­
tem of punishment that requires sentencing based on a "mechani­
cal" calculation by the judge according to the Sentencing Table 
rather than on the judge's discretion.34 
The Sentencing Table is a 258-box grid that has six criminal 
history categories on the top margin and forty-three offense levels 
on the left margin.35 The Guidelines operate by assigning point val­
ues to the two sub-factors to be considered in sentencing-the cur­
rent offense and the characteristics of the defendant. The current 
offense can be enhanced by adding points that are largely derivative 
of the circumstances of the crime committed. For example, if a de­
fendant was convicted of robbery, section 2B3.1 declares that the 
base offense level (left margin) is set at twenty.36 However, this 
31. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 991(b)(1) (2000». 
32. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(a)(1) (2000). 
33. Id. § 3553(a)(2). 
34. Id. § 3551. Prisoners, however, may earn "good time" credits and be released 
from prison, under supervision. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra 
note 3, §§ 5D1.1, 5D1.2. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 63. 
35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5A, at 377; see infra 
Appendix B. 
36. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2B3.1(a). 
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level may be increased if a firearm was discharged during the com­
mission of the robbery.37 
The Guidelines also provide a point valuation for the crimimll 
history of the defendant. Responding to the direction of Congress 
to provide a system that accounts for the characteristics of the de­
fendant, the Guidelines provide enhanced punishment for repeat 
offenders. The Guidelines comment that 
[a] defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more 
culpable than a first offender. . .. General deterrence of crimi­
nal conduct dictates ... that repeated criminal behavior will ag­
gravate the need for punishment . . . . Repeated criminal 
behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful 
rehabilitation.38 
This results in more severe punishment for those defendants who 
have a lengthy criminal past.39 The severity of the sentence is de­
termined by increasing the "criminal history category" of the 
defendant. 
In addition to adding points to the "base level" of the current 
offense, prior convictions result in points that are aggregated to de­
termine the criminal history category, which is represented by the 
top margin of the Sentencing Table.40 The number of points a de­
fendant receives toward his criminal history category depends on 
the length of the prior sentence; the circumstances surrounding 
those convictions, including whether the criminal act was commit­
ted while on probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, 
work release, or escape status; and the timeliness of the current 
crime in relation to the prior convictions.41 By matching the appro­
priate criminal history category (column) with the current offense 
level (row), the court is given the precise range for the sentence to 
37. [d. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). 
38. Id. § 4Al.1, introductory cmt. 
39. While the commentary to the Guidelines explains that repeat offenders will 
have a sentence imposed with respect to the four principles of punishment, the in­
creased length of punishment for repeat offenders leads to the logical conclusion that 
incapacitation was the primary driving force behind the criminal history structure. See 
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 55; see also Erik G. Luna, Foreword, Three 
Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1998). In discussing California's 
three strikes law, Erik Luna describes that increased punishment for recidivist offenders 
incorporates two principles of punishment, incapacitation and deterrence. Id. For ad­
ditional similar comments, see R. Daniel O'Connor, Note, Defining the Strike Zone­
An Analysis of the Classification of Prior Convictions Under the Federal "Three-Strikes 
and You're Out" Scheme, 36 B.c. L. REV. 847, 848 (1995). 
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4A1.1. 
41. [d. § 4Al.1(d). 
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be imposed.42 Thus, to "avoid sentencing disparity 'among defend­
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct,' "43 the Sentencing Table provides an empirical 
measure that normalizes sentences across the country. Repeat of­
fenders with a history of multiple violent crimes will receive longer 
sentences under the enhancement provisions described above, 
while repeat offenders with a history of non-violent crimes receive 
lower sentences.44 
In addition to section 4A1.1, under which the defendant's crim­
inal history determines the criminal history category,45 part B of 
chapter 4 of the Guidelines provides that in some circumstances, a 
defendant's criminal history will increase both the criminal history 
category and the base offense level. This effectively increases the 
sentence to a much higher incarceration period than if only the base 
level or the criminal history category were increased. Section 4B1.1 
provides an enhancement for "career offenders."46 This section 
provides: 
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least 
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the in­
stant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is 
a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled sub­
stance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense.47 
Similar to the "career offender provision," which applies to defend­
ants who fall within the definition of section 4B1.1 and commit any 
crime punishable for more than a year, the Guidelines also contain 
crime-specific multiple-offender enhancement provisions. Section 
4B1.4 provides enhancement for "career offenders" whose current 
offense is being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 
U.S.c. § 922(g). Even prior to the creation of the Guidelines, Con­
gress had previously provided a specialized enhancement for multi­
ple offenders who were convicted under 18 U.S.c. § 922(g), as part 
42. See infra Appendix B. 
43. STITII & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 71 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 991(b)(1)(B) 
(2000)). 
44. For example, see supra text accompanying notes 1-6. If Price's prior convic­
tion for carrying a concealed weapon was considered a non-violent crime, he would 
have received a sentencing range of 12-18 months, as opposed to it being considered a 
violent crime where the sentencing range is 30-37 months. 
45. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.1(b). 
47. Id. § 4Bl.l(a). 
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of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).48 Therefore, section 
4B1.4, the "armed career criminal" provision in the Guidelines, in­
corporates the ACCA.49 
The ACCA provides sentencing enhancement for an individual 
who is facing a current conviction of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 922(g), and who has three previ­
ous convictions for violent felonies. In such a scenario, that individ­
ual faces a minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years.50 The 
Guidelines, through section 4B1.4, provide sentencing for "armed 
career criminals" under the ACCA, ensuring that the sentence im­
posed is at least the fifteen years as stated in ACCA and possibly 
longer depending on further circumstances of the crime.51 While 
the ACCA requires a determination of whether a prior conviction 
was for a "violent felony"52 and the Guidelines require a determi­
nation of whether the prior convictions were "crimes of violence," 
they have been interpreted by the courts to encompass the same 
crimes,53 and both are interpreted to have the same meaning. 
48. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 18,98 Stat. 2185, 
repealed by Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 458 
(1986) (current version at 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(1) (2000». 
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.4 cmt. back­
ground ("This section implements 18 U.S.c. § 924(e) [Armed Career Criminal Act]."). 
50. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, § 1802. 
51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 4B1.4(b), (c). Sub­
section (b)(3)(B) provides that the base offense level is set at 33, and subsection (c)(3) 
provides that the lowest possible criminal history category is Category IV. This will 
result in a minimum sentence of 188 months or 15 and one-half years. Subsections (b) 
and (c) both provide for an increase in the base offense level and an increase in the 
criminal history category if certain circumstances are present. It is not necessary for 
this Note to delve into all the possible factual scenarios that may result in a given case. 
For further information, see id. 
52. 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(I) (2000). 
53. Although the commentary accompanying § 4B1.4 declares that the "defini­
tions of 'violent felony' and 'serious drug offense' in 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(2) (2000) are 
not identical to the definitions of 'crime of violence' and 'controlled substance offense' 
used in § 4B1.1," at least in the context of violent felony and crime of violence, the 
differences are minor. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.4, 
cmt. n.1. Compare 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added) (defining "violent fel­
ony" as any crime punishable for a term exceeding one year ... that ... (i) has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 
of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another"), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a) (em­
phasis added) ("The term 'crime of violence' means any offense under federal or state 
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that-(I) has as an 
element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, 
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
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Therefore, whether a prior conviction is considered a crime of vio­
lence has a direct impact on both the criminal history category and 
the base offense level of a defendant facing sentencing under sec­
tions 4B1.1 and 4B1.4. 
C. The "Advisory" Guidelines-Post Booker v. United States 
The sentencing dynamic changed again ~vith a constitutional 
challenge of the Guidelines in 2005, in Booker v. United States .54 
The Supreme Court found that, in certain cases, the Guidelines op­
erated unconstitutionally.55 The Court held that "[a]ny fact (other 
than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence 
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a 
plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."56 The Court's hold­
ing rested upon Sixth Amendment57 grounds, that the "interest in 
fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial ... has 
always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly."58 The 
Court further held that if the Guidelines were not mandatory and 
binding on judges, "the selection of particular sentences in response 
to differing sets of facts .. } would not implicate the Sixth Amend­
ment. "59 To accomplish the goal of rendering the Guidelines advi­
sory instead of mandatory, the Court excised two sections of the 
Guidelines,60 18 U.S.c. § 3553(b)(1)61 and 18 U.S.c. § 3742(e).62 
another."). See also United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(holding the definitions of "violent felony" and "crime of violence" as identical and that 
the interpretation of one can be used for the other); O'Connor, supra note 39, at 851. 
54. Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
55. The constitutional concern arose when a defendant's sentence was increased 
due to the application of the Guidelines' provisions, above the statutory maximum for 
the crime for which the jury issued its verdict. Id. at 244. 
56. Id. 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all crimi­
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the' right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." 
Id. 
58. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. 
59. Id. at 233. 
60. Id. at 259-61. 
61. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(b )(1) (2000) ("The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, 
and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ade­
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described ...."). 
62. 18 U.s.c. § 3742(e) (2000) (concerning the judicial review of sentencing ac­
cording to the Guidelines that maintains the "mandatory" nature of the Guidelines). 
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By rendering the Guidelines merely advisory, the Court dimin­
ished the power of the Guidelines. However, the Guidelines' im­
portance has not been diminished. While courts are not strictly 
"bound by the federal guidelines, [they] must continue to consult 
the provisions of the federal guidelines and consider them in sen­
tencing. "63 This consideration "necessarily requires the sentencing 
court to calculate the Guidelines sentencing range in the same man­
ner as before Booker."64 Following the calculation of a sentence 
according to the Guidelines, the court may "impose a more severe 
or more lenient sentence as long as the sentence is reasonable."65 
Therefore, the Booker decision has little impact on the importance 
of determining the applicability, scope, and interpretation of the 
provisions of the Guidelines. 
D. Ascertaining the Scope of the Crime of Violence Provision 
While the Guidelines have reduced the influence and discre­
tion of the judiciary in the area of sentencing, judges still retain an 
important interpretive role. The provisions in the Guidelines are 
sometimes broad, ambiguous, or unclear, so judges must determine 
which provisions are applicable, and their proper scope. As illus­
trated in the Introduction above, the determination that a prior 
conviction of carrying a concealed weapon was a crime of violence 
could nearly double the sentence received.66 
1. The Plain Language of the Crime of Violence Provision 
The crime of violence provision has been a fertile source for 
judicial analysis. The crime of violence provision has two main 
clauses and attempts to provide an inclusive illustration of the 
crimes intended by the drafters to be within the scope of the en­
hancement provision. In order for any crime to be considered a 
crime of violence, it must be one to which the defendant could have 
been punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,67 
63. United States v. Davila-Rodriguez, 166 F. App'x 399, 402 (11th Cir. 2006); see 
also United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005). 
64. Crawford, 407 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 
1325, 1332 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
65. Id. at 1179. 
66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
67. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a); see also id. 
§ 4A1.1 cmt. background. The defendant need not have served more than a year; 
rather, the availability of a term of imprisonment exceeding a year must have existed. 
The purpose for this is that the Commission recognized that "[t]here are jurisdictional 
variations in offense definitions, sentencing structures, and manner of sentence pro­
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and it must also fit within one of the two clauses of the statute. The 
first clause requires that in order for a prior conviction to be a 
crime of violence it must "[have] as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of an­
other. "68 The second clause includes a conviction that "is burglary 
of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or oth­
erwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another. "69 In short, the crime of violence provi­
sion separates the included offenses into two subcategories; (1) 
physical force crimes and (2) non-physical-force crimes that create 
a serious risk of physical injury to another. 




In addition to the language of the provision, the Sentencing 
Commission included commentary (Commentary) to the Guide­
lines designed to "provide[] concrete guidance" as to how to apply 
the provisions, and thus, the Commentary accompanying the crime 
of violence provision is helpful in determining its scope.?o The Su­
preme Court in Stinson v. United States established the binding 
force of the Commentary to the Guidelines.?1 Stinson pleaded 
guilty to robbery of a bank in Florida.72 The district court sen­
tenced Stinson as a career criminal under § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines 
as a result of two prior convictions, which the court determined 
were predicate offenses within the scope of the crime of violence 
provision.?3 Among Stinson's prior convictions was one for unlaw­
ful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.c. 
§ 922(g).74 Stinson appealed his sentence, claiming that the district 
court improperly interpreted his firearm possession conviction as a 
crime of violence.?5 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
nouncement," which require individualized consideration. Id. Furthermore, "[tJo mini­
mize problems with imperfect measures of past crime seriousness, criminal history 
categories are based on the maximum term imposed in previous sentences rather than 
on other measures, such as whether the conviction was designated a felony or misde­
meanor." Id. 
68. 	 [d. § 4B1.2(a)(I). 
69. 	 Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). 
70. 	 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993). 
71. 	 Id. at 37-38. 
72. 	 Id. at 38. 
73. 	 Id. 
74. 	 Id. 
75. 	 Id. at 39. 
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held, however, that the possession of a firearm by a felon "was, as a 
categorical matter, a crime of violence."76 
Following the Eleventh Circuit's denial of Stinson's appeal, the 
Sentencing Commission amended the Commentary to the crime of 
violence provision.77 The amendment provided that a "'crime of 
violence' does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a 
firearm by a felon. "78 Stinson filed a second appeal in the Eleventh 
Circuit seeking retroactive application of the Commentary.79 The 
Eleventh Circuit denied Stinson's second appeal for a rehearing on 
the issue, holding that the Commentary to the Guidelines is not 
binding on the courtS.80 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed 
with the Eleventh Circuit's characterization of the Commentary, 
and held that the Commentary is binding on the courts provided 
that it "does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute [and 
that] it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly errone­
ous or inconsistent with the regulation."'81 Furthermore, the Court 
noted that the Commentary "represent[s] the most accurate indica­
tions of how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be 
applied to be consistent with the Guidelines Manual."82 Thus, the 
Commentary accompanying the Guidelines is binding authority on 
the courts. 
The Commentary accompanying the crime of violence provi­
sion separates "crimes of violence" from non-violent crimes by es­
tablishing inclusive lists of crimes. "'Crime of violence' includes 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex 
offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, 
and burglary of a dwelling."83 The crime of violence provision ex­
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 4B1.2, cmt. n.2 
(1993»; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2, cmt. 
n.1. 
79. United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, Stinson v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). The court noted that "[a]lthough commentary should 
generally be regarded as persuasive, it is not binding." Id. at 815. Furthermore, they 
were doubtful of the Sentencing Commissions' power through amendment to nullify the 
precedent of the circuit courts. Id. 
80. Id. at 815. 
81. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 
U.S. 410, 414 (1945». 
82. Id. 
83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1. 
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plicitly illustrates only one excluded crime in the Commentary-the 
crime of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.84 
Therefore, the Commentary provides a non-exhaustive list of 
crimes to be included or excluded under the crime of violence pro­
vision, and while such a list may be helpful, it is incomplete.85 Thus, 
it does not provide absolute guidance to the courts in determining 
whether to include offenses that are not enumerated in the statute 
or in the Commentary. 
3. 	 The Legislative History of the Crime of Violence 
Provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act 
Further guidance into the scope of the crime of violence provi­
sion can be found in the legislative history of the ACCA. The 
ACCA is a "crime specific" enhancement provision that operates 
identically to, and is interpreted to coincide with, the general crime 
of violence enhancement provision of the Guidelines.86 The ACCA 
began as an enhancement for convicted felons who "receive[ ], pos­
sess[ ], or transport[ ] ... a firearm" if the defendant had been pre­
viously convicted of three felonies of robbery or burglary.87 In 
1986, this provision was recodified as 18 V.S.c. § 924(e)88 and 
amended again by replacing the term "any felony" with "any crime 
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. "89 Sec­
tion 924(e) was further amended less than six months later, ex­
panding the predicate offenses by replacing "robbery or burglary" 
with any "violent felony or serious drug offense. "90 
Following further debate, Congress proposed two versions of 
the ACCA in order to establish a consensus over the definition of a 
crime of violence. The first, proposed by Senator Specter in the 
Senate and Representative Wyden in the House, defined "crime of 
violence" as "'an offense that has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or prop­
84. 	 Id. 
85. Cj id. ("Other offenses are included a.s 'crimes of violence' if (A) that offense 
has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the 
conduct set forth ... presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."). 
86. 	 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
87. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1802,98 Stat. 2185, 
repealed by Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 
Stat. 458 (current version at 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(I) (2000)). 
88. 	 Firearm Owner's Protection Act, § 104. 
89. 	 Id. 
90. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582 (1990) (citing Career Criminals 
Amendment Act of 1986 § 1402, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-37,3207-37 to -38). 
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erty of another,' or any felony 'that, by its nature, involves a sub­
stantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.' "91 
The second bill narrowly defined "crime of violence" as "an offense 
that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person ... of another."92 The compro­
mise of both of these bills is the current definition used in 
§ 924(e).93 What is significant is that the House Report concerning 
this compromise further described that debate centered on the con­
cern of including "violent felonies ... against property."94 
Following this legislative history, the Supreme Court in Taylor 
v. United States95 had to determine what type of burglaries the pro­
vision intended to include in the second clause, which explicitly re­
fers to burglary.96 The Court declared that, in creating the ACCA, 
"Congress focused its efforts on career offenders-those who com­
mit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of liveli­
hood. "97 The Court further observed that the predicate offenses 
were not limited to crimes actually involving violence, as contained 
in the first clause, but they also extended to some property crimes, 
including burglary, "because of [those crimes'] inherent potential 
for harm to persons."98 
Therefore the legislative history of the crime of violence provi­
sion of the ACCA provides a solid foundation for ascertaining the 
provision's scope. First, the history indicates that the provision in­
cludes all offenses that have as an element, a violent act.99 Second, 
the drafters intended to include certain property crimes which may 
not result in actual physical violence, but include conduct that in­
creases the risk of violence to such a degree that they should be 
treated as violent crimes. 
91. Id. at 583 (citing S. 2312, 99th Congo (1986) and H.R. 4639, 99th Congo 
(1986». 
92. Id. (citing H.R. 4768, 99th Congo (1986)). 
93. See supra note 53. 
94. H.R. REP. No. 99-849, at 3 (1986). 
95. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575. 
96. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a)(2). 
97. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587. 
98. Id. at 588. 
99. A violent act in this respect is represented by the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force. 
816 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:801 
4. 	 Scope of Judicial Review: A Categorical Approach to 
the Guidelines 
Determining the scope of the crime of violence provision is not 
limited to a plain language analysis coupled with the intent of the 
drafters. In addition to these tools of statutory construction, it is 
also necessary to determine the permissible inquiry of the court into 
the past crime. In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that a trial court must take a formal categorical approach to a prior 
conviction and cannot look into the facts surrounding the convic­
tion to determine if it is a crime of violence. loo A formal categorical 
approach limits the sentencing court's inquiry to include only the 
conviction documents together with the statutory definition of the 
crime. The alternative approach, a fact-finding based approach that 
allows a sentencing court to look into the particular facts of the 
prior conviction, was held by the Court to be improper on two 
grounds. lOl 
First, the Court held that the text itself supports a categorical 
approach, and not a fact-finding based approach. The Guidelines 
use terms that are broad and detached from a specific factual cir­
cumstance. Section 924(e) "refers to 'a person who ... has three 
convictions' for-not a person who has committed-three previous 
violent felonies," suggesting that the focus is on a detached review 
of the conviction record and not the particular actions of the defen­
dant.1°2 Furthermore, the provision applies to "any crime" that 
"has [violence] as an element," which is significantly broader than if 
the provision used the phrase, "any crime, that in a particular case" 
involved violence.103 
Second, the legislative history illustrates that Congress in­
tended a categorical approach, namely that if a court was supposed 
to "engage in an elaborate fact finding process regarding the defen­
dant's prior offenses, surely this would have been mentioned some­
where in the legislative history."104 The Court also noted that a 
fact-finding based approach could lead to a possible violation of the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.lOS 
100. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 600-01 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 924(e» (omission in original). 
103. Id. at 600. 
104. Id. at 601. 
105. Id. 
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Therefore, in determining whether a prior convIctIOn is in­
cluded within the crime of violence provision, a court may only look 
at the statutory definitions of the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted. Additionally, a court must only determine whether the 
conduct, expressed through the elements of the crime, presents a 
"serious risk of physical injury to another. "106 For example, exigent 
factors, such as intent to injure, cannot be used as a basis for deter­
mining whether the defendant's conduct presented a serious risk of 
injury, unless the intent was an element of the crime for which the 
defendant was found guilty.107 
A formal categorical approach, in limiting the permissible ar­
eas of inquiry for a sentencing court, attempts to normalize sentenc­
ing among the federal courts.108 Since a sentencing court must look 
at the generic definition of a crime through the elements of con­
duct, differences between state laws are reduced to common ele­
ments of conduct. 
E. Carrying a Concealed Weapon 
In order to determine whether any crime should fall within the 
scope of the crime of violence provision, it is necessary to under­
stand the elements of the crime and the pertinent and informative 
aspects of that crime. This section will provide an analysis of the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon. It will first explore the pro­
hibited conduct by illustrating the generic common elements of the 
crime. Next, it will provide a comparative analysis between the dif­
ferent state laws, illustrating that the prohibition of carrying a con­
cealed weapon differs vastly among the states. Finally, this section 
will look at the circumstances in which it is permissible to carry a 
concealed weapon. 
1. State Law Analysis of the Prohibited Conduct 
The crime of unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon is prima­
rily governed by state law109 and is based upon the principle of gen­
106. See id. at 602. 
107. See id. (citation omitted) (holding that a court must only look at "the fact of 
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. This categorical approach 
... may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a 
narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements ...."). 
108. See id. at 590-92. 
109. There are federal laws that prohibit carrying a concealed weapon in specific 
circumstances. For example, 49 V.S.c. § 46505(b)(1) (2000) prohibits a person who, 
"when on, or attempting to get on, an aircraft in, or intended for operation in, air trans­
portation or intrastate air transportation, has on or about the individual or the property 
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eral deterrence.uo Its aim is not to curb a direct wrong against 
another person or a person's property, but rather, to deter someone 
from having the instrument to commit a wrong against a person in 
the future. l11 It is essentially a preventative crime. In State v. Chip­
pey, the court explained one rationale for crirninalizing the act of 
carrying a concealed weapon.112 The charge to the jury explained 
that: 
Every statute has some purpose and meaning. The object of this 
statute is to prevent the carrying of concealed deadly weapons 
about the person; because, persons becoming suddenly angered 
and having such a weapon in their pocket, would be likely to use 
it, which in their sober moments they would not have done, and 
which could not have been done had not the weapon been upon 
their person. l13 
There are three general elements of the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon. First, the person must knowingly possess a fire­
arm.114 Second, the firearm must be concealed.us The term "con­
cealment" is broad and opens the door to a wide range of factual 
of the individual a concealed dangerous weapon that is or would be accessible to the 
individual in flight." See also 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000), which makes it "unlaw­
ful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that other­
wise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has 
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 u.s.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). This 
Note, however, focuses on state law for several reasons. First, the federal statutes, as 
the ones above indicate, share the same elements as the state crimes, and thus would 
not affect the analysis of this Note. Second, the power of the federal government to 
regulate firearms possession is limited. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(f), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). In determining whether Con­
gress has the authority to criminalize possession of a firearm on school property, the 
Lopez Court noted that '''[s]tates possess primary authority for defining and enforcing 
the criminal law.'" Id. at n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)). 
The Court held that Congress may only regulate such possession within the constricted 
powers of the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 
3. Since this regulatory power is limited, the case law pertinent to this Note is absent. 
On the other hand, the issue of this Note has arisen out of state law convictions, and 
thus, this Note focuses only on state laws. 
110. See supra note 28 (definition of deterrence). 
111. William Meyerhofer, Note, Statutory Restrictions on Weapons Possessions: 
Must the Right to Self-Defense Fall Victim?, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 219, 220-21 (1996) 
(stating that "[t]he theory behind the efficacy of [weapons] laws is simple: preventing 
the possession of a weapon will prevent any opportunity for its misuse"). 
112. State v. Chippey, 33 A. 438, 438 (Del. 1892). 
113. Id. 
114. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
legislation). 
115. Id. 
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determinations, but the simplest explanation is that the weapon be 
"hidden from common observation."116 The third factor is that the 
weapon must be "readily accessible" for use, distinguishing the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon from mere possession of a 
firearm.ll7 Although not explicit in the text of concealed weapons 
statutes, the courts have generally inferred this requirement when 
interpreting the requirement that the weapon must be "on or 
about" the person.11S In State v. Blazovitch, the court interpreted 
the phrase "about" to include carrying a weapon in a bag or satchel 
as being within the spirit of the law, which was to prevent a person 
from unlawfully having access to a weapon.119 The importance of 
the manner of concealment, i.e., whether the weapon is "on" the 
person or "about," has also been broadened to include having the 
weapon "in such proximity to the person as to be convenient of 
access and within immediate physical reach" even In an 
automobile.120 
While these three elements are common to most state laws, 
they are not universal, and there can be striking differences be­
tween the states in the punishable conduct with regard to the pos­
session or carrying of a weapon. For example, some states do not 
require that a weapon be concealed in order to violate a "carrying" 
law.121 In fact, Massachusetts, which has one the most stringent 
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
117. See, e.g., People v. Bolling, 537 N.E.2d 1100, 1102-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); 
State v. Nebbitt, 713 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Erickson, 362 N.W.2d 
528, 532 (Iowa 1985); Bailey v. State, 442 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); 
Commonwealth v. Lanzetti, 97 Pa. Super. 126, 128 (1929). 
118. Bolling, 537 N.E.2d at 1102-03; Nebbitt, 713 S.W.2d at 50; Erickson, 362 
N.W.2d at 532; Bailey, 442 So. 2d at 386; Lanzetti, 97 Pa. Super. at 128. 
119. State v. Blazovitch, 107 S.E. 291 (W.Va. 1921). 
To come within the letter or terms of the statute, however, the act must 
amount to a carrying of such weapon about the person of the accused. It need 
not be on his person within the strict meaning of these words. If carried in a 
container of some kind held in the hand of the accused, it is manifestly about 
his person, though it may not be on his person. 
Id. at 292. 
120. Hampton v. Commonwealth, 78 S.W.2d 748, 749-50 (Ky. 1934). 
121. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); D.C. 
CODE § 22-4504 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-47-2­
1(a), 35-47-2-23(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, 
§ 10 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(1)(a) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(b) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation). 
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penalties, does not require concealment122 or even that the firearm 
be loaded to be a violation.123 
The penalties for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of 
the law also differ dramatically among the states. Below is a table 
that illustrates the maximum penalties for all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. 
Maximum Imprisonment Term 124 
Lawful to Carry a Concealed Weapon: 
Alaska, Vermont 
30 Days: 
North Carolina, Oklahoma 
90 Days: 
South Carolina, Washington 
6 Months: 
Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Wyoming 
One year: 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
Exceeding One Year: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Mas­
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Penn­
sylvania, Rhode Island 
By comparing the laws of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, several observations can be made. First, there is a wide 
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10. 
123. Id. If State v. Chippey provides an accurate reasoning for restricting the car­
rying of a concealed weapon, the law in Massachusetts seems to be an anomaly. In 
Chippey, the reasoning of the prohibition was premised upon carrying a deadly weapon 
and using it against another when angered. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying 
text. In Massachusetts, apparently, a person is prohibited from carrying even a non­
deadly (i.e., unloaded) firearm. It makes this author wonder exactly what the reasoning 
in Massachusetts is for their restriction of unloaded firearms. 
124. See infra Appendix A, notes 197-202, for citations to the applicable state 
laws that provided the information for this table. 
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range of penalties for carrying a concealed weapon, from no pen­
alty125 in Alaska and Vermont to the possibility of a ten-year sen­
tence in Rhode Island. 126 Second, and most important, not all state 
statutes could invoke a crime of violence analysis for a subsequent 
conviction in federal court. This is because the Guidelines require 
that in order for a prior conviction to be considered a crime of vio­
lence it must be a crime for which the person could have served 
more than one year in prison.127 Of the fifty states and the District 
of Columbia, only thirteen have laws under which carrying a con­
cealed weapon could be considered a "crime of violence" under the 
Guidelines: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Mary­
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.128 In the other thirty-eight states 
and the District of Columbia, a conviction for carrying a concealed 
weapon could never be considered a crime of violence for enhance­
ment purposes of a later crime in federal court.129 
125. While Alaska and Vermont do not criminalize the general conduct of carry­
ing a concealed weapon, they do provide some restrictions. See ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.61.220 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation), which provides that any person 
over the age of 21 can carry a concealed weapon, except that they cannot carry a 
weapon into a courthouse, schoolyard, bar, or domestic violence shelter. Vermont's 
pertinent statute allows anyone to carry a concealed weapon so long as he does not do 
so with "the intent or avowed purpose of injuring a fellow man," and does not do so 
"within any state institution or upon the grounds or lands owned or leased for the use 
of such institution, without the approval of the warden or superintendent of the institu­
tion." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. l3, § 4003 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
126. R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
127. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a) (requiring 
that the crime must be "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"). 
128. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-206(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1442 (prohi­
bition), 4205 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 790.01(2)-(3) (prohibition), 775.082 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 leg­
islation); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/24-1.6(a), (d) (prohibition); 730 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. ANN. 515-8-1(a)(7) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 724.4(1) (prohibition), 903.1(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 
2006 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-101(West, Westlaw through 2006 
legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10; MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 750.227(2)-(3) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 571.030(1)(5) (prohibi­
tion), 558.011(1)(4) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2C:39-5(b) (prohibition), 2C:43-6(a)(3) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 
2006 legislation); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.02(6) (prohibition), 70.00(2)(d) (punishment) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6106(a)(I) (pro­
hibition), 1103(3), 1104(1) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.1. 
GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
129. This raises an interesting dilemma in that persons convicted in the thirteen 
states listed could face enhancement, while persons convicted in the remaining thirty­
eight jurisdictions could not. It would seem then, that it may be impossible to normal­
ize sentencing across the country, which will be discussed further in this Note. See infra 
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2. 	 Authorized Conduct: States Permit Carrying a Concealed 
Weapon Through a Permitting Process 
In addition to the striking differences in how states punish the 
crime, carrying a concealed weapon is not categorically prohibited. 
As described above, Alaska and Vermont do not prohibit the act at 
all,13° and the thirteen states that have laws that could fall under the 
crime of violence provisionl31 actually allow certain persons to 
carry a concealed weapon. Carrying of a concealed weapon is per­
missible if a person goes through a permitting process.l32 While 
these thirteen states have unique and specific requirements, there 
are common requirements among all states in determining the eligi­
bility of a person to carry a concealed weapon. 
First, the person must be of minimum legal age, usually eigh­
teen or twenty-one. l33 Second, a criminal history background 
check is required because prior criminal convictions may be a basis 
for denial, depending on the type of crime committed.l34 The third 
common requirement is that the person must complete a certified 
Part II. Aside from any arguments that may stem from this particular conundrum, 
which will not be entertained in this Note, it does illustrate that the crime of carrying a 
concealed weapon does not have universal application. 
130. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003. 
131. That is, these states have laws which punish the crime by imprisonment ex­
ceeding one year as required by the crime of violence provision. 
132. See infra text accompanying notes 133-137. 
133. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-28(b)(10); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1441(a)(I) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) ("of full age"); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 790.06(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 430 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 65/ 
4(a)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.8(1) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (eighteen years of age); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, 
§ 122 ("not a minor"); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 28.422(3)(b) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.090(1)(1) (West, Westlaw through 
2006 legislation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legisla­
tion); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 11-47-11(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
134. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(b)(2); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1441(a)(I) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(2)(d) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 430 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 65/4(a)(2)(ii) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.8(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131P(a); MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. §§ 28.422(3)(d)-(e) (West, West law through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 571.090(1)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 400.00(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 6109(e)(i)(iii)-(iv) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11­
47-11(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
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firearms handling course.135 Additionally, the permitting process of 
some states may require a determination of whether the person is 
of "good moral character"136 or whether the issuing authority has 
"probable cause to believe that the applicant would be a threat to 
himself or herself or to other individuals. "137 While the general 
purpose of prohibiting a person from carrying a concealed weapon, 
as artfully stated in State v. Chippey,138 is that a person may present 
a risk to others with a weapon in hand because people can be sud­
denly angered, and thus, act violently, the states have drawn a line 
determining that the danger lies within the characteristics of the 
person carrying the weapons and not the mere act of carrying. 
Therefore, the states have uniformly developed a system that allows 
"safe" persons to carry a concealed weapon, and prevents "unsafe" 
persons from doing the same. 
F. 	 An Analysis of Case Law Concerning the Interpretation of 
Weapons Possession/Carrying Crimes Under the Crime of 
Violence Provision 
The courts of appeals are split over the issue of whether a prior 
state conviction of carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of vio­
lence under the Guidelines. The primary issue of dispute between 
the courts is whether carrying a concealed weapon "presents a seri­
ous potential risk of physical injury to another. "139 
In 1991, in United States v. Whitfield, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant's prior concealed 
weapons conviction was not within the scope of the "other­
wise c1ause."140 The court did, however, note that "[a]lthough 
carrying an illegal weapon may involve a continuing risk to others, 
the harm is not so immediate as to 'present[] a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another,'" as required by 18 U.S.c. 
135. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(b)(1); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1441(a)(3); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(2)(h); 447 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 35/35-35(d) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 724.9-.11; MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 140, § 131P(a); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 28.422(3)(h)(i); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 400.00(1)(f). 
136. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1441(a); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(b); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(d)(3) (requiring that the sheriff "shall investigate whether 
the applicant's character and reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to 
act in a manner dangerous to public safety"). 
137. 	 MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 28.422(3). 
138. 	 State V. Chippey, 33 A. 438, 438 (Del. 1892). 
139. 	 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a)(2). 
140. United States V. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 1990); see infra note 
155 and accompanying text. 
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§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).141 Recently, in the 2002 case of United States v. 
Crawley,142 a district court in the Tenth Circuit reviewed the issue 
of whether the defendant's prior Missouri conviction for carrying a 
concealed weapon was a crime of violence under the Guidelines.143 
The court, persuaded by the reasoning in Whitfield, concluded that 
carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime of violence.144 Most 
notably, the court also commented that the actual location of the 
firearm, whether on the person or readily accessible by its proxi­
mate location to the person,145 makes no difference in the analysis 
of whether the conviction is a crime of violence or not.146 Instead, 
the court held: 
That the weapon is found on the person rather than on the floor­
board or seat of a vehicle is not enough in itself to say the risk of 
physical injury created by a firearm's presence is now serious. 
The court is not satisfied that the imminence or likelihood of vio­
lence associated with a person carrying a weapon is appreciably 
different from that presented when the weapon is simply other­
wise readily available to a person.147 
Therefore, in both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the courts have 
concluded that the risk involved in carrying a concealed weapon 
does not rise to the level required by the crime of violence 
provIsIon. 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has consistently held that car­
rying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence because the risk 
created by the conduct reaches the level required by the provision. 
Since being overruled in Stinson v. United States, 148 which resulted 
in the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm being ex­
cluded from the crime of violence provision, the Eleventh Circuit 
141. Whitfield, 907 F.2d at 800. 
142. United States v. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. Kan. 2002). 
143. Id. at 1253. 
144. Id. at 1256. 
145. To satisfy the element of having a weapon "on or about" the person, the 
firearm could be located on the person, in a bag, or in a car, see supra text accompany­
ing notes 118-120. 
146. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1256-57. Although not an argument raised in 
this Note, the court's comments anticipate further arguments on the issue, that the risk 
created by the conduct may change in particular circumstances. Ultimately, however, 
this would be a failing argument since the court is restricted to a formal categorical 
approach and cannot inquire into the specific conduct of a defendant, unless that con­
duct is expressed in the elements of the crime. See supra text accompanying notes 100­
108. 
147. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84. 
825 2007] THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE 
has attempted to provide support for including the crime of carry­
ing a concealed weapon as a crime of violence by drawing a distinc­
tion from unlawful possession by a felon. 
Beginning with United States v. HaLl,149 and continuing to 
United States v. Price,150 the Eleventh Circuit has remained consis­
tent in its decisions.151 In Hall, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the 
government's argument on appeal that carrying a concealed 
weapon is an "active conduct crime" and that the danger extends 
beyond "mere possession" because "the person has taken the extra 
step of having the weapon immediately accessible for use on 
another."152 
Thus, the courts of appeals have diverged over the interpreta­
tion of whether carrying a concealed weapon is a "crime of vio­
lence." The case law described above illustrates that this issue has 
been reduced to a simple analysis and judgment of the risk created 
by the conduct. Because evaluating risk is invariably a subjective 
endeavor, the conflicting conclusions of these courts should not 
come as a surprise. It is this SUbjectivity that is at the heart of the 
argument set forth in Part II below. 
II. ANALYSIS 
This Note argues that a prior conviction for carrying a con­
cealed weapon is not a crime of violence under the enhancement 
provisions in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. First, by 
utilizing the canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded from the scope of 
the provision since it is dissimilar to the enumerated crimes in the 
provision. Second, assuming that the first argument fails to per­
suade the courts, this Note provides an alternate reason why the 
crime is not within the scope of the provision. The second argu­
ment focuses on the insufficiency of the current approach to analyz­
ing the crime of violence provision taken by the courts, and 
introduces a proper approach, which yields only one conclusion, 
that carrying a concealed weapon is not a "crime of violence." 
149. United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1996). 
150. United States v. Price, 132 F. App'x 341, 343 (11th Cir. 2005). 
151. See Hall, 77 F.3d at 401; United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence, relying on 
the holding in Hall, 77 F.3d at 401); see also Price, 132 F. App'x at 343 (holding the 
same by referring to Hall, 77 F.3d at 401, Gilbert, 138 F.3d at 1372, and United States v. 
Adams, 316 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2003». 
152. Hall, 77 F.3d at 401. 
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A. 	 The Crime of Carrying a Concealed Weapon Is Dissimilar 
to the Enumerated Crimes of the Crime of 
Violence Provision 
Carrying a concealed weapon is not within the scope of the 
crime of violence provision since it is dissimilar, in nature and char­
acteristics, to the enumerated crimes in the provision. A crime of 
violence is defined as: 
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprison­
ment for a term exceeding one year, that-(l) has as an element 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise in­
volves conduct that presents a serious potential risk ofphysical in
jury to another .153 
Since carrying a concealed weapon is not one of the enumer­
ated crimes listed within this definition,154 its inclusion must neces­
sarily fall in the provision of "otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" 
(hereinafter the "otherwise clause").155 The "otherwise clause," 
however, is not an independent and separate clause in the provi­
sion, but rather, is tied directly to the entire second clause, which 
explicitly enumerates includable offenses such as burglary, arson, 
and extortion.156 
Ejusdem generis is a canon of interpretation declaring that a 
"general term" must be interpreted "to reflect the class of objects 
reflected in more specific terms accompanying it."157 In Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams,158 which provides an illustration of the canon 
ejusdem generis and its application, the Supreme Court invoked the 
canon while interpreting a broad, general statutory term.159 In Cir­
cuit City, the plaintiff Adams brought suit alleging discrimination, 
153. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2 (emphasis 
added). 
154. Simply, it does not have as an element "the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force," nor is it a "burglary ... , arson, or extortion, [nor] 
involves use of explosives." See id. 
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN­
UAL, supra note 3, §§ 2K2.1, 4B1.2. 
156. For similar comments, see Jeremy D. Feinstein, Note, Are Threats Always 
"Violent" Crimes?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (1996). 
157. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 375 (2000). 
158. 	 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
159. 	 Id. at 114. 
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and sought to avoid the arbitration provision in his employment ap­
plication through an exemption in the Federal Arbitration Act.160 
At issue was the scope of the exemptions to the Federal Arbitration 
Act,161 which provides for the exclusion "from the Act's coverage 
'contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com­
merce.' "162 Adams argued that the arbitration provision on his em­
ployment application with Circuit City was not binding since it was 
a "contract of employment" and he was a worker engaged in inter­
state commerce. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed 
and held that the arbitration provision, as part of an employment 
contract, was excluded from the FAA.t63 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit by 
invoking ejusdem generis. The Court held that this general term 
which seemingly includes all contracts of employment involving 
workers in commerce cannot be read so broadly as to render the 
preceding explicit reference to "seamen" and "railroad employees" 
pointless. Ultimately, they held that ejusdem generis requires that 
"the residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms 
'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled 
and defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers 
which are recited just before it."l64 Therefore, the statute should be 
confined to "transportation workers. "165 
The "otherwise clause" is a similar general term, since on its 
face it lacks specificity and serves as a means for including non­
enumerated crimes, following a series of enumerated crimes. 
Therefore, under the canon of ejusdem generis, the "otherwise 
clause" must be interpreted to include offenses similar in nature 
and characteristics to the enumerated crimes. 
The common thread among these enumerated crimes is that 
they all require an affirmative act that produces a primary harm to 
another. Burglary requires the entering or remaining inside a 
building of another-essentially the damage of another's property 
through the invasion of his building.166 Arson requires the starting 
160. Id. at 109-11. 
161. 9 U.S.c. § 1 (2000). 
162. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 109 (quoting 9 U.S.c. § 1). 
163. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 17 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
164. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115. 
165. Id. at 109. 
166. Burglary is defined under the prior version of the ACCA as "entering or 
remaining surreptitiously within a building that is property of another with the intent to 
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of a fire causing the destruction of a building of another.167 Extor­
tion requires any act of either force or coercion to compel another 
to act.168 All of these enumerated crimes have statutory elements 
that include an overt act that produces a primary harm to another, 
and thus, ejusdem generis requires that the "otherwise clause" in­
corporates crimes that have these essential elements: (1) an overt 
act that (2) produces a primary harm against another. 
The canon of ejusdem generis, however, is not applicable when 
it would cause a result conflicting with the intent of Congress. I69 
Restricting the "otherwise clause" to crimes that share these two 
elements is not to invoke judicial veto over a piece of legislation, 
but rather, it attempts to further the intent of the drafters of the 
legislationpo The requirement of a primary harm to another is 
supported by the intent and purpose of the provision, as expressed 
through the legislative history of the ACCA. The legislative history 
of the ACCA shows that Congress intended to include physically 
violent crimes in the first clause, but also intended to include prop­
erty crimes.I7l These crimes do not actually result in physical vio­
lence, but still create the potential risk of such injury.In 
Essentially, the drafters did not want people to escape responsibil­
ity for the inherent violence of their actions because of the mere 
engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State offense." Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (citing 18 U.S.c. § 1202(c)(9), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-308, 
§ 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986)). 
167. A person is guilty of arson under the Model Penal Code § 220.1 "if he starts 
a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose of: (a) destroying a building or occupied 
structure of another." Model Penal Code § 220.1. 
168. Extortion is defined as "[t]he act or practice of obtaining something or com­
pelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion." BLACK'S LAW DICTION­
ARY, supra note 28, at 623. 
169. See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 
117, 128-29 (1991) (holding that ejusdem generis "does not control ... when the whole 
context dictates a different conclusion"); see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 
128 (1936) ("The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumen­
tality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty. Ordina­
rily, it limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those 
specified; but it may not be used to defeat the obvious purpose of legislation. And, 
while penal statutes are narrowly construed, this does not require rejection of that sense 
of the words which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view."). 
170. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETI, supra note 157, at 254 (noting that ejus­
dem generis "capture[s] our intuitions about legislators' linguistic decisions, namely, 
that people use lists to link similar concepts and to illustrate coherent patterns"). 
171. Supra text accompanying notes 90-99. 
172. Id. 
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chance that no one was injured.173 More simply put, an arsonist 
should not escape the legal consequences of the violent nature of 
setting a building ablaze merely because he lucked out in that no 
one was in the building at the time. By considering crimes that 
never actually resulted in physical harm to be the same, in degree of 
culpability, as those that do result in physical harm, the drafters had 
to make some limitations to avoid creating a rule so broad that it 
would encompass most criminal acts. If there were no limitations to 
the provision, almost all crimes could present a serious potential 
risk of injury to another, depending on the particular facts of a 
given case. 
For example, the crime of driving without a license could pre­
sent a serious risk of physical injury to another since the licensing 
process ensures that people know how to drive safely. Therefore, 
without a license a court may presume that the driver lacks this 
knowledge of safe operation of a vehicle, and conclude that the per­
son's unsafe driving presents a serious risk of physical injury to an­
other. Such broadening of the crime of violence provision would 
inevitably conclude that most crimes could be included, which 
would, in effect, change the provision from a violent criminal his­
tory enhancement to a "general" criminal history enhancement. 
This would present a clear problem of redundancy in the Guidelines 
since a "general" criminal history enhancement is already provided 
for under section 4A1.1.174 
Essentially, the intent of the drafters was to treat certain prop­
erty crimes that create a serious potential risk of physical violence, 
but that do not actually result in physical violence, in a similar man­
ner as if the physical violence came to fruition.175 Applying this 
analysis to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, the only con­
clusion is that carrying a concealed weapon is not within the scope 
of the crime of violence provision. To be convicted of carrying a 
concealed weapon, a person must have a weapon "on or about his 
person," the weapon must be "hidden from common observation," 
173. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 597 (1990) (finding that "Congress 
thought that certain general categories of property crimes-namely burglary, arson, ex­
tortion, and the use of explosives-so often presented a risk of injury to persons ... that 
they should be included in the enhancement statute even though, considered solely in 
terms of their statutory elements, they do not necessarily involve the use or threat of 
force against a person"). 
174. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4A1.1; see also 
supra text accompanying notes 41-44. 
175. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 597. 
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and be "readily accessible" for use.176 The crime does not require 
physical injury to another or damage to another's property. In fact, 
since the crime requires "concealment,"177 bystanders do not even 
know that a person is carrying such a weapon, and thus, they have 
not actually been affected-they are completely oblivious to the 
crime. Therefore, under the canon of interpretation ejusdem 
generis, the crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded from 
the crime of violence provision since it is dissimilar to the enumer­
ated crimes in the provision by lacking an overt act that produces a 
primary harm to another. 
In addition to an enumerated list of includable offenses within 
the crime of violence provision, the Commentary to the Guidelines 
provides for the exclusion of the crime of being a felon in posses­
sion of a firearm. While the courts are in disagreement as to 
whether the crime of carrying a concealed weapon is similar to un­
lawful possession of a firearm by a felon,178 the logic behind exclu­
sion of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon 
provides guidance. As Judge Posner stated in United States v. 
Lane,179 a felon is "no doubt more likely to make an illegal use of a 
firearm than a non-felon," but there is no evidence that the risk of 
such use is "substantial."180 Judge Posner illustrated that ex-felons 
"have the same motives as lawful possessors of firearms to possess a 
firearm-self-defense, hunting, gun collecting, and target prac­
tice."181 While the use of a firearm may lead to a crime of violence, 
Judge Posner opined that "[a] crime that increases the likelihood of 
a crime of violence need not itself be a crime of violence."182 While 
the Eleventh Circuit held that carrying a concealed weapon is dif­
ferent from the crime of being a felon in possession due to the fact 
that the weapon must be readily accessible,183 the difference is im­
material and insignificant to the analysis. The crucial factor is that 
includable crimes must have an overt act that produces a primary 
harm to another. Neither the crime of carrying a concealed 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 116-117. 
177. Note the exception of the Massachusetts statute, which does not require con­
cealment. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see 
supra text accompanying note 122. 
178. See supra Part I.F (discussing the split among the courts in finding similari­
ties and differences between the two crimes). 
179. United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2001). 
180. Id. at 906. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 907. 
183. See United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 401-02 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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weapon, nor being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm have, 
as an element, an overt act that produces a primary harm to an­
other.184 Judge Posner was pointing to the logical disconnect be­
tween what may happen and what has happened, that while 
possession of a firearm may lead to violence, no violence has actu­
ally occurred. Both crimes, carrying a concealed weapon and un­
lawful possession by a felon, share this same trait; the opportunity 
for violence is available, but no overt act with a primary harm has 
been inflicted upon another. Therefore, while carrying a concealed 
weapon is not identical in all aspects, namely the "readily accessi­
ble" requirement to the explicitly excluded offense of unlawful pos­
session of a firearm by a felon, it does share the necessary 
characteristic of lacking an overt act that results in a primary harm 
to another. Since neither crime has the determinate characteristic 
of an overt act that results in primary harm to another, they are 
similar. Therefore, the canon of ejusdem generis provides support 
for excluding carrying a concealed weapon from the crime of vio­
lence provision, by grouping it with the excluded crime of unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon. 
B. 	 Carrying a Concealed Weapon is not Conduct that by its 
Nature, Presents a Serious Risk of Physical Injury 
to Another 
1. 	 Insufficiency of Current Approach by the 

Courts of Appeals 

In addition to exclusion under ejusdem generis, carrying a con­
cealed weapon is beyond the scope of the language of the crime of 
violence provision. The "otherwise clause" is limited to crimes 
which contain conduct that by its nature presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.18S This section will argue that 
under a proper approach, an objective categorical approach, the 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 114-118 (elements of carrying a con­
cealed weapon). The crime of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon restricts any 
person 
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or 
to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce. 
18 V.S.c. § 922(g) (2000). 
185. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a)(2) cmt. 
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crime of carrying a concealed weapon does not include conduct that 
by its nature presents a serious risk of physical injury to another. 
The circuits are split regarding the inclusion of the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon in the crime of violence provision, es­
sentially due to the approach the courts utilize in answering the 
question. Assuming that a court could interpret carrying a con­
cealed weapon as a crime that fits within the general category of 
crimes included in the provision, a sentencing court must further 
determine whether the conduct of carrying a concealed weapon 
presents a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another."186 
The discrepancy between the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits re­
sults from the subjective determination of whether the crime of car­
rying a concealed weapon presents enough "potential risk" of 
"serious physical injury" to fall within the scope of the provision. 
Since the Guidelines were created to correct disparity of sentenc­
ing, any interpretation, including a sUbjective categorical approach, 
of a provision of the Guidelines that opens the possibility of dispar­
ity among the courts must necessarily fail. Sentencing criminals in 
accordance with an objective standard was a fundamental purpose 
and principle of the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission cre­
ated an objective valuation standard in sentencing, where a defen­
dant's sentence is merely calculated by adding up the point values 
the Guidelines assign to a particular circumstance of consideration 
instead of leaving a large amount of room for judicial interpreta­
tion. This general approach strongly suggests that the Guidelines 
were created to efficiently employ a mechanical valuation system 
and remove any broad, ambiguous language that would allow sub­
jective determinations. In addressing the proper approach to the 
Guidelines, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States attempted 
to restrict subjective determinations by implementing the formal 
categorical approach. 
The formal categorical approach of Taylor restricts the sen­
tencing court's analysis to the generic definition of a crime, and 
rests upon the notion that the language and intent behind the crime 
of violence provision was to normalize the application of the provi­
sion across the country. In Taylor, the inclusion of "burglary" was 
at issue, and although explicitly included in the provision, the crime 
of burglary, a state law crime, is defined in a variety of ways by the 
states.187 For example, Michigan "has no offense formally labeled 
186. [d. § 4B1.2(a)(2). 
187. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990). 
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burglary," but rather classifies the conduct in "grades of 'breaking 
and entering.' "188 Therefore, a sentencing court in Michigan may 
look only at Michigan law in determining whether the defendant's 
prior conviction for "breaking and entering" is within the scope of 
the crime of violence provision. In so doing, it is possible to con­
clude that it is not within the scope of the provision since it is not 
labeled "burglary." To resolve this problem, the Supreme Court 
held that the language and the intent of the drafters in drafting the 
provision was that the focus should be on the "conduct" of the 
crime, no matter how a particular state labels such conduct in its 
criminal code.189 
The holding in Taylor, however, is insufficient in addressing the 
issue of whether carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence, 
since the Taylor court dealt with an enumerated crime. Ascertain­
ing the proper definition is conclusive in cases in which an enumer­
ated offense of the provision is at issue since the sole question, as in 
Taylor, is whether the defendant committed a crime listed in the 
provision. The "otherwise clause" requires a secondary analysis af­
ter determining the generic definition of the prior offense commit­
ted by the defendant: whether the conduct of the offense "presents 
a serious risk of potential physical injury to another." Applying the 
same rationale to this clause of the provision, as the Supreme Court 
did in Taylor to ascertain the definition of the crime, the issue is 
resolved-expand an objective standard to the determination of 
whether the conduct presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another. 
2. 	 An Objective Categorical Approach to Analyzing the 
Crime of Violence Provision 
An objective categorical approach to defining the crime of car­
rying a concealed weapon incorporates not only the crime's general 
statutory elements, but also its generic characteristics, including 
how the states punish and how they have evaluated the risk created 
by the conduct.190 Under an objective categorical approach, the 
188. Id. (quoting MICH. COMPo LAWS § 750.110 (1979». 
189. Id. at 592 ("We think that 'burglary' in § 924(e) must have some uniform 
definition independent of the labels employed by the various States' criminal codes."). 
190. See also United States V. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1363 (4th Cir. 1993). The 
Fourth Circuit held that in applying the categorical approach of Taylor, "courts must 
necessarily make common-sense judgments about whether a given offense proscribes 
generic conduct with the potential for serious physical injury to another." /d. (emphasis 
added). Both the common sense approach and the objective categorical approach, pro­
posed in this Note, attempt to accomplish the same objective-to establish a method for 
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crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded since the states 
have illustrated that it is not the conduct of the crime, but rather, 
characteristics of the defendant that make the crime present a seri­
ous potential risk of physical injury to another. 
All states allow people to carry a concealed weapon.l91 In fact, 
both Vermont and Alaska have no affirmative requirements for its 
citizens to be able to carry a concealed weapon.192 The other states 
allow people to carry a concealed weapon provided that they apply 
for and receive a permit from the state to do so. The permitting 
exception (as well as Vermont and Alaska) illustrates two impor­
tant issues in determining whether the crime of carrying a con­
cealed weapon is included in the crime of violence provision: (1) it 
clarifies and defines the conduct, and (2) it is an excellent measure 
of how the states weigh the risk of that conduct. 
As Part I.E indicates, the general purpose of criminalizing car­
rying a concealed weapon is that people can be suddenly angered, 
and if an angered person has a hidden weapon, they may be able to 
employ it with unfair surprise against another. Superficially, this 
seems to fit exactly within the definition of a crime of violence­
carrying a concealed weapon has the potential risk ofphysical injury 
to another. However, since States allow certain people (those with 
permits) to carry a concealed weapon, one cannot logically con­
clude that the states are giving people the opportunity to put others 
at a potential risk of injury. The States are emphatically declaring 
that it is not the conduct that creates the risk, but rather, the person 
that creates the risk. The permitting process is an official determi­
nation by the state that the person is a risk or is not a risk. If a 
person is granted a permit, he is not a risk, and by carrying a con­
cealed weapon his conduct, likewise, does not present such risk of 
injury to another. In contrast, if a person is denied a permit, the 
state has determined that he is a risk, and thus, by carrying a con­
cealed weapon, he is creating a risk of injury to another.193 
analysis that provides a consistent interpretation of the crime of violence provision 
among the federal courts. 
191. Only thirteen states are at issue in this Note since the provision provides a 
term of imprisonment restriction, which applies only to thirteen states. See supra text 
accompanying notes 127-128. 
192. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation). 
193. The assertion that the State has made a formal determination that a person 
is a risk (i.e., he was denied a permit for carrying a concealed weapon and thus by 
carrying he is creating a risk to another) does not undermine the analysis of the provi­
sion in this Note. To the contrary, it directly supports one of the principles upon which 
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Since the crime of violence provision requires the conduct to 
be the risk creating factor, carrying a concealed weapon is not 
within the scope of the provision. Furthermore, since being con­
victed of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon necessarily re­
quires absence of a permit, for a court to determine that it is a 
crime of violence it must presume that absence of a permit is con­
clusive evidence that the person is one that the state has deter­
mined is a risk. 
C. 	 Absence of a Permit to Carry a Concealed Cannot Be 
Conclusive Evidence that Such Person is a Risk 
Lacking a permit to carry a concealed weapon cannot be con­
clusive evidence in deciding that the person is a risk, for such deter­
mination makes an illogical leap that will fail in actual application 
by including persons who are not a risk. 
A hypothetical is necessary to illustrate this point. Suppose de­
fendant A applies for a permit on January 1, 2006, because she is in 
fear of her life and safety from an abusive husband. The permitting 
process takes time to complete. Since A is in immediate danger, 
she cannot wait, and thus begins carrying a concealed weapon on 
January 1, 2006. Defendant A is pulled over on a typical traffic stop 
for speeding, and while searching for her driver's license, the police 
officer sees the handle of a pistol in her purse. Because defendant 
A lacks a permit, the police officer arrests her for carrying a con­
cealed weapon. 
Was defendant A, by carrying a concealed weapon, creating a 
serious risk of physical injury to another? As previously stated, the 
determination of being a risk under state law stems from the per­
mitting process. However, unlike a situation in which a person was 
granted a permit (determined by the state not to be a risk) or de­
nied a permit (determined by the state to be a risk), defendant A is 
in a gray area-she has had no formal official determination of risk 
by the state. 
The ultimate answer as to whether defendant A was a risk, and 
thereby her conduct was a risk, lies in whether she could have ob­
tained a permit at the time she was arrested for the crime. If she 
would have been denied a permit, the State would view her as a 
this argument rests, that any risk in carrying a concealed weapon is determined not by 
the act, but by the actor. Since the provision requires an analysis of the conduct, such 
conclusion that the actor creates the risk clearly takes this crime out of the intended 
scope of the provision. 
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risk, and by carrying a concealed weapon her conduct would have 
created a risk of harm. On the other hand the opposite is also true; 
if defendant A would have been able to receive a permit, by her 
nature she was not a risk when she was carrying the concealed 
weapon, and thus, her conduct is not a risk either.194 
In order to properly conclude that carrying a concealed 
weapon presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, the 
court must determine the particular characteristic of the defen­
dant-namely whether the defendant could have obtained a permit. 
This would be a fact-finding based approach to interpreting the 
crime of violence provision, and would be able to resolve any dis­
crepancies. However, the Supreme Court has emphatically refused 
to allow such an approach on two grounds; first, a fact-finding 
based approach is not authorized by the Guidelines, and second, 
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial also pre­
cludes the judge from making factual determinations that were not 
submitted to the jury.195 Instead, courts are limited to a categorical 
approach and must only look at the elements of the crime.196 Since 
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon makes no mention of 
whether the defendant was within the class of "risky persons" (una­
ble to obtain a permit), under the proper approach to the Guide­
lines-the objective categorical approach-a court could never 
conclude that the act of carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of 
violence. 
CONCLUSION 
While the structure of criminal sentencing has evolved and 
changed during the life of our nation, criminal law and sentencing 
has been and always will remain the prerogative of the people. 
Criminal law is society'S collective manner of governing ourselves, 
for there is no greater expression of our will than that which dic­
tates permissible and impermissible conduct. Furthermore, crirni­
194. This argument is not intended to suggest that if one could have received a 
permit he should not face criminal liability. The argument is only limited to determin­
ing whether. when the act was committed, the person was a "risk," as defined by the 
state permitting laws. It should be noted, however, that Pennsylvania does extend this 
logic also to the criminal liability for the conduct itself. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6106(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) provides that a person who car­
ries a concealed weapon without a valid permit commits a felony in the third degree; 
however, clause (2) reduces the crime to a misdemeanor in the first degree for persons 
who would have been eligible to obtain a valid license. 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 100-108. 
196. Id. 
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nal sentencing is a measure of what laws we deem most important, 
and what conduct we deem most urgent to punish, deter, and reha­
bilitate. As it stands today, the structure of criminal sentencing is 
uncertain with the introduction of the Booker holding, rendering 
the Guidelines advisory. However, since courts still must consult 
the Guidelines in determining the proper sentencing range, the in­
terpretation of the particular sections of the Guidelines remains im­
portant. Because of this, any interpretation of a clause in the 
Guidelines must be true to the Guidelines in both language and 
purpose. 
It is for these reasons that the crime of carrying a concealed 
weapon is excluded from the scope of a crime of violence on multi­
ple grounds. First, the crime is dissimilar in character to those enu­
merated crimes in the statute and the commentary, and thus the 
canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, excludes it from 
the provision. Additionally, the crime of carrying a concealed 
weapon is also excluded from the provision after applying the 
proper approach to the provision. By expanding the holding in Tay­
lor, a formal categorical approach, to adequately handle cases of 
crimes that are not enumerated, a sentencing court is left with an 
objective categorical approach. This approach forces a sentencing 
court to take a generic, objective view toward the risk evaluation 
process, in addition to the established generic approach to the defi­
nition of the crime as suggested by the Taylor Court. By objectively 
adopting the risk evaluation that the states have already made, a 
sentencing court is provided clear guidance; the conduct of carrying 
a concealed weapon, by its nature, does not present a serious poten­
tial risk of physical injury to another, and therefore is not a "crime 
of violence." 
Neal Eriksen 
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ApPENDIX A 
MAXIMUM IMPRISONMENT TERMS FOR 
CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON 
Lawful to Carry a Concealed Weapon:197 
Alaska, Vermont 
30 Days:198 
North Carolina, Oklahoma 
90 Days:199 
South Carolina, Washington 
6 Months:2OO 
Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Wyoming 
One year:201 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
197. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation). 
198. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1272 (prohibition), 1276 (punishment) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.C GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-269 (prohibition), 15A­
1340.23(c) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
199. S.C CODE ANN. § 16-23-460 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.41.050 (prohibition), 9.92.030 (punishment) (West, 
West law through 2007 legislation); 
200. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-50 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3102 (prohibition), 13-707(A)(I) (punishment) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-3302 (prohibition), 18-113 (punish­
ment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104 (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-37-1 (West, Westlaw through 
2006 legislation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-316 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legisla­
tion); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-7-2 (prohibition), 31-19-1(L) (punishment) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.12 (prohibition), 
2929.24(A)(I) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 166.240(1) (prohibition), 161.615(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 
2005 legislation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95 (West, Westlaw through 2006 
legislation ). 
201. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-73-120 (prohibition), 5-4-401(b)(I) (punishment) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12025 (West, Westlaw 
through 2007 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-12-105 (prohibition), 18-1.3­
501 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); D.C CODE §§ 22-4504 
(prohibition), 22-4515 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-126 (prohibition), 17-10-3 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 
2006 legislation); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-51 (prohibition), 701-107 (punishment) 
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Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
Exceeding One Year:202 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Mas­
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Penn­
sylvania, Rhode Island 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-47-2-1(a) (prohibi­
tion), 35-50-3-2 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); KAN. CRIM. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 21-4201(a)(i) (prohibition), 21-4502(a) (punishment) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 527.020(1)(9) (prohibition), 
532.090(1) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2001-A, 2004 (prohibition), tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(D) (punishment) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.714(1)(a) (prohibition), 
609.03(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§§ 28-1202(1)(2)(3) (prohibition), 28-106 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 
legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202.350(1)(d)(1)-(4), (2)(a)(I) (prohibition), 
193.140 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 159:4 (prohibition), 625:9(IV)(a)(I) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 leg­
islation); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 62.1-04-01, 62.1-04-05 (prohibition), 12.1-32-01(5) (pun­
ishment) (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-14­
9(1)(2) (prohibition), 22-6-2(1) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1307(a)(I)(2) (prohibition), 39-11-110 (punishment) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 46.02(a)-(b) (prohibi­
tion), 12.21(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 76-10-504(1) (prohibition), 76-3-204(1)-(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-308(A)(i)-(iv) (prohibition), 18.2­
l1(a) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61­
7-3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 941.23 (prohibi­
tion), 939.51(3)(a) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation) (nine 
months). 
202. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-206(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1442 (prohibition), 4205(b)(7) (punishment) (West, 
Westlaw through 2007 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.01(1)-(3) (prohibition), 
775.082 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. 
ANN. 5/24-1.6(a), (d) (prohibition), 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (punish­
ment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 724.4(1) (prohi­
bition), 903.1(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-101 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 269, § 10 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§§ 750.227(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 571.030(1)(5) (prohibition), 558.011(1)(4) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 
2006 legislation); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-5(b) (prohibition), 2C:43-6(a)(3) (punish­
ment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.02(6) (prohi­
bition), 70.00(2)(d) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6106(a)(I) (prohibition), 1103(3), 1104(1) (punishment) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 legislation). 
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ApPENDIX B 
SENTENCING TABLE203 
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points) 
V 	 VI 

Offense 	 I U m IV (10, 11, (13 or 
Level 	 (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7,8, 9) 12) more) 
Zone A 	 1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 

2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7 

3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9 

4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12 

5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15 

6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18 

7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21 

8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24 

Zone B 9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27 

10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30 

Zone C 11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33 

12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37 

Zone D 13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41 

14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46 

15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51 

16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57 

17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63 

18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71 

19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78 

20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87 

21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96 

22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105 

23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115 

24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125 

25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137 

26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150 

27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162 

28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175 

29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188 

30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 

31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 

32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 

33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 

34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 

35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 

36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 

37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 

38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 

39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 

40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 

41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 

42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 

43 life life life life life life 

203. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, sentencing table. 
